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Occupational defined benefit (DB) pension schemes in the UK are generally constituted 
as trusts, placing control over pension fund assets in the hands of trustees who make or 
shape decisions about investment, contributions and benefits. Regulatory reforms since 
the turn of the century have fastened on trustees as crucial actors in pension scheme 
governance. Reforms have sought to strengthen their role, define their responsibilities, 
and improve their qualifications. In this paper, I examine the hopes and expectations of 
these reforms. More trustee expertise has been advocated as the solution to two quite 
different kinds of problem: increasing the security of pension promises and reducing the 
risk of calls on public funds, and improving schemes’ investment strategies. These 
different problems are matched by different conceptions of what expertise really entails. I 
argue that there has been a tendency to promote expertise in the form of conventional and 
shared knowledge. This has created an illusion of greater security in pension promises, 
and has done nothing to improve schemes’ investment strategies. 
 
It is commonly said that trustees have wide discretion, but in the context of pension funds 
this claim is misleading. Trustees have to make decisions and find solutions that are 
acceptable to employers, members and the regulator. While only the regulator has a 
formal (if rarely exercised) veto power over trustee decisions, employer agreement is 
necessary for decisions on ongoing contributions to a pension scheme. Disaffected 
employers can respond to trustee demands by closing the scheme to new members or new 
accruals. Even members can respond if they are not satisfied with trustee decisions: they 
can sometimes choose not to join a scheme, they can negotiate a cash alternative, and via 
employer-union negotiations they can influence employers’ decisions.  
 
These possibilities for exit may seem remote, but many occupational pension schemes 
have closed in recent years, so exit is happening. This may be for reasons unrelated to 
trustee decisions, or because trustees are powerless to make a difference given the 
pressures that schemes are under. However, closure may also indicate that trustees have 
exercised their discretion poorly, and have failed to steer a course sufficiently close to the 
interests of the parties to prevent exit. The following discussion explores this possibility. 
Specifically, it examines whether moves to enhance the financial expertise of trustees 
could have had the effect of propelling more schemes towards closure. 
 
At first sight, this is a counterintuitive hypothesis. More financial expertise should mean 
that funds are better managed, increasing the size of the pension ‘pie’ and making it 
easier for trustees to settle on decisions which satisfy the conflicting interests of the 
parties. However, when one looks carefully at what financial expertise is meant to bring 
to pension management, few claims are made for ‘pie’, and the evidence reviewed below 
is inconclusive and even sometimes negative. The reason for this can be summarised 
briefly as follows. If financial markets are efficient, it is not possible systematically to 
‘beat the market’. Star managers cannot deliver ‘alpha’: sustained outperformance in a 
particular asset class. Instead, a pension fund’s investment performance will depend on 
two things: the selection of asset classes, and the fees and commissions incurred. By 
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investing in riskier classes of asset, a pension fund can achieve higher returns. For 
reasons discussed below, financial experts may advocate low-risk investment, which will 
mean less ‘pie’.1  
 
Thus the appointment of more financial experts to be pension fund trustees is not 
generally advocated on the grounds that it will mean that the scheme will achieve 
investment outperformance. The following discussion takes a close look at exactly what 
advocates of more expertise have sought. It is shown that advocates have rested their 
arguments on two opposing conceptions of financial expertise. One, which I term 
‘pluralist’, sees expertise in terms of capacity to challenge, contest and argue. This is the 
conception advanced in the 2001 Myners Review of institutional investment in the UK. 
This review is often seen as the inspiration for reforms to trusteeship in the 2004 Pensions 
Act, and yet the promotion of trustee expertise subsequent to that Act has embraced a 
quite different conception, in which expertise means a common body of knowledge and 
understanding. It is argued below that the incentives of the regulator have contributed to 
the promotion of this conformist or conventional notion of expertise. Conformist experts 
may choose policies which are close to the preferences of the regulator but too distant 
from the interests of employers and members to ensure scheme survival. 
 
The following discussion starts by reviewing available studies on the difference that 
trustees make to outcomes. The lack of conclusive evidence of a relationship between 
trustee expertise and scheme performance presents a puzzle: why has there been such a 
drive to enhance expertise? Focusing on the UK case, section three takes up the 
arguments of the Myners Review in detail, and section four describes how trustee 
expertise has been promoted post-Myners. Section five reviews theoretical accounts of 
the tension between representation and expertise, and examines why experts might not 
have the same preferences over outcomes as members and employers, and section six 
concludes by drawing out some implications of the expertise-based distancing of 
trusteeship from member and employer engagement. 
 
2. Expertise and the size of the pension fund pie 
Funded pension schemes gather contributions now and promise to pay pensions later. For 
schemes to thrive, the promise must be credible. The employer’s backing is one source of 
credibility, but the thrust of regulatory change in UK occupational pensions has been to 
create another source of credibility, based on the pension fund itself. There is a focus on 
valuation: the promise is credible if the fund can be demonstrated to be adequate to meet 
the commitments that have accrued. But the process of valuation leaves margins of 
discretion, and members’ confidence in the exercise of discretion depends on the 
governance of the fund. Members themselves are not in a position to take decisions about 
the investment strategy of the fund, nor to establish an appropriate discount rate for 
                                                 
1 One of the most reliable ways to increase the pie is to reduce costs. One way to do this is to adopt a 
passive (index-tracking) investment strategy, which should mean that the scheme matches benchmarks for 
the asset classes chosen, while incurring minimal costs. Another way is to create larger schemes which can 
take advantage of economies of scale to reduce costs. Insofar as such schemes could also support more 
expertise on their trustee boards, this can mean that expertise is correlated with lower costs, but this is not 
necessarily a causal connection.  
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liabilities (accrued commitments). The task of making these decisions is delegated to 
trustees. 
 
Trustees are a particular kind of agent. One of their distinguishing features is the 
suppression of their own pecuniary interests: the duty of loyalty requires them to act 
without regard to their personal gain. Traditionally, trustees have often executed their 
functions without payment, a practice which emphasised their lack of financial interest in 
the trust. Pension fund trustees are nowadays usually paid in compensation for the time 
they spend, but they do not have incentive contracts which reward them for achieving 
specified outcomes. Such a contract would be wrong in principle as it presumes that 
trustees are financially motivated; it could also be seen as fettering the discretion of 
trustees in the direction desired by the incentive designer.  
 
In large UK pension funds, there are usually three groups of trustees: employer 
nominated trustees (ENTs), member nominees (MNTs) and ‘independents’, selected for 
their expertise, particularly in investment matters. In DB schemes, ENTs have a strong 
incentive to put effort into enhancing the performance of the scheme, as employers are 
the residual claimants: they have to make up deficits, and they benefit from surpluses 
through reduced contributions.2 However, while ENTs have clear incentives to control 
administrative costs, their effectiveness in enhancing investment returns is more 
contentious. They have incentives to seek high returns; the difficulty is that they also 
have incentives to accept risk, perhaps excessively so. If corporate decision-makers 
contemplate insolvency with equanimity, they have a one-way bet. Either the strategy 
pays off, or the employer becomes insolvent and defaults on its obligations to the scheme. 
As the next section discusses, statutory efforts to strengthen the institution of trusteeship, 
and make trustees more independent of the employer, followed from employer failures.3 
 
In the (presumably) more general case where insolvency is not in prospect, Exley et al4  
drew on the insights of financial economics to argue that a pension scheme that uses a 
risky strategy to meet its liabilities imposes a hidden cost on the shareholders of the firm, 
who are bearing more risk than they (may) realise. If shareholders are alert to the risks 
being taken with their equity, they should insist that the pension fund is de-risked, and 
place a discount on the market price of equity if this is not done. It follows that attention 
to shareholder value maximisation may raise the cost of pension schemes.5 However, 
there is no conclusive evidence that shareholders ‘punish’ employers for pension scheme 
risks.6  
 
If ENTs have incentives to favour a high-risk, high-return investment strategy, this might 
be countered by MNTs concerned to ensure that members’ benefits are safe. But the 
                                                 
2 Besley T and Prat A, 'Credible Pensions' (2005) 26 Fiscal Studies 119, 128. 
3 Mesher J, 'The Operation of Pension Funds' (1992) 21 Industrial Law Journal 232. 
4 Exley CJ, Mehta SJB and Smith AD, 'The Financial Theory of Defined Benefit Pension Schemes' (1997) 
3 British Actuarial Journal 835. 
5 Monk AHB, 'The Financial Thesis: Reconceptualizing Globalisation’s Effect on Firms and Institutions' 
(2009) 13 Competition and change 51 
6 Orszag JM and Sand N, 'Corporate Finance and Capital Markets ' in Clark GL, Munnell AH and Orszag 
JM (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income (OUP 2006). 
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choice of investment strategy for MNTs is complex.7 If the employer’s backing in case of 
deficits is secure, and at the same time any surplus accrues to the employer, MNTs have 
no reason to concern themselves with asset allocation. If there is a possibility of employer 
default, MNTs will tend to favour a lower-risk investment strategy than the employer, 
and instead press the employer to repair the scheme by increasing contributions. In this 
situation, MNTs might act as a counterweight to employer influence over the running of 
the scheme. But if a scheme is threatened with closure or if there is cost-sharing between 
employers and members, MNTs may tilt towards seeking higher investment returns. The 
assessment of the costs and benefits of risk-taking will be different for different cohorts 
of members, from pensioner members to recent joiners. For pensioners, a low risk 
strategy may be most effective in protecting their benefits. For the workforce, a low-risk 
investment strategy means higher demands for contributions, which will mean lower 
take-home pay if there is cost-sharing.8 If the employer sees the scheme as too costly and 
closes it, younger members are worst affected. It follows that MNTs who are oriented 
towards the current and future workforce may accept more risk than those who are 
oriented towards protecting the benefits of pensioner members. 
 
Some indirect evidence that MNTs do not always force employers to reduce risk and pay 
more contributions comes from experience in the UK in the decade after the Pensions Act 
1995. This Act mandated that boards should have at least one-third MNTs, although there 
were loopholes. But MNTs apparently failed to force more conservative strategies on 
employers, leading to further statutory changes in 2004. These sought to change the 
weight of MNTs’ concerns towards conservatism by, among other things, promoting 
more representation of pensioner interests.9 Since the 2004 Act there has also been a 
sustained drive towards having more independent trustees. For reasons discussed below, 
independents may promote less risky investment strategies. 
 
Turning to the available evidence, a much-cited UK study found that, the more control 
the sponsoring company exercised over the pension fund (measured by the proportion of 
ENTs), the more likely it was to pursue a high-risk, high-return investment strategy.10 
The authors interpret this as an agency problem, with employer nominees more inclined 
to take risks with members’ benefits. But this interpretation has been challenged. For 
example Phan and Hegde11 argue that high-risk and return investment strategies are 
associated with sponsoring employers that are in a strong position to bear risk in their 
                                                 
7 Some sense of this complexity can be gained from an epic study by McCarthy and Miles which showed 
how trustees’ preferred investment allocation will depend on the security of the employer covenant, the 
existence of insurance (e.g. a Pension Protection Fund) and the current level of scheme funding. McCarthy 
and Miles do not distinguish between trustee types, but their account fits the problem facing a trustee who 
seeks to maximise the welfare of scheme beneficiaries.  See McCarthy D and Miles D, 'Optimal Portfolio 
Allocation for Corporate Pension Funds' (2013) 19 European Financial Management 599. 
8 Most economists would expect that higher employer pension contributions reduce take-home pay even in 
the absence of formal cost-sharing.   
9 Cockerill V, 'Does size matter — How should trustees approach the new member trustee requirement?' 
(2006) 12 Pensions 12. 
10 Cocco JF and Volpin PF, 'Corporate Governance of Pension Plans: The UK Evidence ' (2007) 63 
Financial Analysts Journal 70. 
11 Phan HV and Hegde S, 'Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking in Pension Plans: Evidence from 
Defined Benefit Asset Allocations' (2012) 48 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
 6 
scheme because they are protected by anti-takeover provisions, and that this is to the 
benefit of members. More generally, there is a fundamental disagreement in the literature 
between those who think that any employer-sponsored risk-taking is suspect12 and those 
who argue that an employer might choose to use its risk-bearing capacity to offer an 
attractive contract to employees. On the latter interpretation, it can be in the employer’s 
business interest to control contribution costs by taking investment risk.13  
 
Andonov et al14 examined how trustee board composition affects the investment strategy 
of US public (state and municipal) pension funds, and found that boards containing more 
politicians engage in more risk-taking, which they interpret as arising from political 
incentives to maintain a high discount rate and thereby make the funding position look 
strong, postponing difficult decisions about contributions and benefits. They also found 
that the presence of elected plan participants (MNTs) leads to riskier strategies. Accrued 
benefits are less well-protected in the US than the UK, so MNTs may be acting on a 
desire to delay reforms which could have negative effects for them. Andonov et al also 
argue that overall plan performance suffers from acting on these incentives, but their 
evidence for this is open to interpretation. They find that public funds with politician-
trustees marginally underperform the benchmark for each asset class they invest in, but 
they do not find that risk-taking damages the overall performance of the fund. In other 
words, it is possible that risk-taking pays off, despite the suspect political incentives that 
induce it. 
 
Harper15 also examined the asset allocation and investment performance of US public 
pension plans, and reached conclusions which are partly consistent with Andonov et al 
and partly contradictory. Focusing on outsider trustees with expertise, he found that they 
had no effect on benchmarked investment performance, but they promoted a more 
conservative asset allocation (a lower share of investment in equities). This is the mirror 
image of Andonov et al’s finding that politicians promote more risk-taking, but contrary 
to them Harper found that the presence of elected MNTs correlated with a higher funding 
level, giving more security to members’ pensions.   
 
The extensive literature review in Harper indicates that researchers have struggled to find 
robust relationships between trustee board characteristics and various performance 
outcomes. The findings of the wider finance literature that ‘alpha’ (outperformance in a 
specific asset class) is elusive are not refuted, but some relationships between board 
composition, risk-taking and funding levels are found. These findings cannot prove that 
outside experts make ‘better’ decisions without knowing what risk profile or funding 
level is optimal for the scheme. Clearly deep and sustained underfunding is undesirable, 
but the proportion of funds in this position is small and the causes of their difficulties 
multiple, preventing generalisations about their governance. Furthermore, Harper notes 
                                                 
12 See eg Exley et al (n 4). 
13 Blake D, 'UK pension fund management after Myners: The hunt for correlation begins' (2003) 4 Journal 
of Asset Management 32. 
14 Andonov A, Bauer R and Cremers M, 'Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates' 
(2016) Unpublished paper. 
15 Harper JT, 'Board of Trustee Composition and Investment Performance of US Public Pension Plans' 
(2008) Rotman ICPM Working Paper. 
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that there might be endogeneity: funds with certain attributes pick trustees who fit those 
attributes.  
 
These issues have not deterred advocates of more expertise in pension fund governance, 
who have assembled other evidence to support their position. Clark claimed that ‘there is 
a significant premium associated with the proper internal governance of pension funds’.16 
However Clark’s conception of that premium is very general; he does not attempt to test 
the quality of pension fund governance by measuring a premium in investment returns. A 
later study by Clark and Urwin17 did argue that ‘good governance’ generated higher long-
term risk-adjusted rates of return, but they presented no evidence of this, and indeed 
noted that a high level of ‘noise’ around investment outturns prevents statistical 
inferences being drawn. Instead, their method was to examine the governance 
arrangements of a number of funds which have performed well against their own 
benchmarks, and thereby identify what appeared to be the key elements of good 
governance. These key elements turn out to be primarily about clear understanding of 
goals and effective delegation, rather than trustee skills as such. 
 
Ambachtsheer et al18 claimed to present evidence of a ‘positive correlation between 
governance quality and fund performance’.  Their measure of ‘governance quality’ was 
based on the judgments of senior executives in 81 pension funds. Fund performance was 
measured as ‘Net Value Added’ (NVA), which is excess returns relative to a passive 
investment strategy, net of investment expenses. As the authors acknowledged, the NVA 
metric has some limitations and the time period for the assessment was rather short. 
Furthermore, CEOs’ subjective assessments of governance quality could be affected by 
fund performance, implying reverse causation. 
 
Ambachtsheer et al found that assessments of governance quality are correlated with an 
indicator of ‘oversight/ management costs’. They argued that poorly-managed funds 
underinvest in oversight and management, and they found the correlation of costs with 
governance quality ‘an encouraging finding’: ‘the CEOs and boards of governors of the 
high-scoring funds are putting their money where their mouth is’.19 Clearly other 
interpretations are possible. CEOs may simply see spending, notably on executive pay, as 
an indicator of quality. If the results on NVA are robust, it may be that executives in 
funds which achieve positive NVA capture these returns in management remuneration, 
raising management costs. There is little that is ‘encouraging’ for pension fund members 
in these findings; instead, they are a salutary reminder that expertise tends to come at a 
price.   
 
                                                 
16 Clark GL, 'Pension fund governance: expertise and organizational form' (2004) 3 Journal of Pension 
Economics and Finance 233, 237. 
17 Clark GL and Urwin R, 'Best-practice pension fund governance' (2008) 9 Journal of Asset Management 
2. 
18 Ambachtsheer K, Capelle R and Lum H, 'The state of global pension fund governance today: Board 
competency still a problem' (2007) ICPM Working Paper. 
19 Ibid, xi. 
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Finally, Davis20 cited a study by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority which 
found that investment returns in corporate funds with lay trustees outperformed returns 
on retail funds with expert trustees. The findings, while clear, do not address the question 
of whether occupational pension funds with expert trustees outperform those with lay 
members, as retail funds have different characteristics to occupational funds. Their costs 
are higher, at least in part for justifiable reasons to do with scale and account 
administration. Critics also argued that the findings were not appropriately adjusted for 
risk. Retail funds had adopted lower-volatility investment strategies, which arguably they 
have to do because there is no corporate sponsor to bear risk. What the study really shows 
is that employers’ willingness to bear risk in DB pensions is potentially a significant 
benefit to those workers who are covered, if it is reflected in the investment strategy.   
 
Summing up, it is difficult to demonstrate that trustee expertise is correlated with superior 
performance by pension funds. There is some evidence that independent trustees steer 
funds towards lower-risk investment strategies, and authors writing from a conventional 
financial economics perspective tend to interpret this as a sign of good governance. 
Others are inclined to assume that expertise is inherently a good thing, especially given 
evidence that non-experts make elementary mistakes in interpreting financial risk and 
choose inconsistent strategies, but the benefits of expertise are not clearly revealed by 
statistical measures. 
 
3. Expertise in the Myners Review 
In the UK, the sustained drive to enhance trustee expertise can be traced back to the 
Myners Review of 2001.21 Boeri et al22 applauded Myners for ‘blowing the whistle’ on 
the low level of financial literacy among pension fund trustees. Surveys conducted for the 
Myners Review23 and by a team led by Gordon Clark at Oxford University24 confirmed 
that both ENTs and MNTs had deficient knowledge of financial markets and investment 
issues.  
 
The primary focus of the Myners review was the overall performance of institutional 
investors in the UK economy. Myners was asked by the Labour government to consider 
how investment practices could be made less oriented to achieving short-term gains on 
the stock market and more supportive of long-term ‘patient’ investment. Pension funds, 
with their high levels of funds under management and long-dated liabilities, were a 
natural focus for this enquiry. However, trustees were not a natural focus: it was Myners’ 
decision to put them centre-stage. This section seeks to demonstrate that Myners adopted 
a pluralistic view of desirable trustee expertise, while the next section shows that this 
orientation has been lost in the subsequent drive to equip trustees with a received 
conventional understanding of finance and investment issues in pensions.  
                                                 
20 Davis RB, 'The survival of the trustee model of governance in the era of financial engineering' in Donald 
MS and Butler Beatty L (eds), The evolving role of trust in superannuation (The Federation Press 2017), 
112. 
21 Myners P, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (HM Treasury 2001). 
22 Boeri T and others, 'Dealing with the New Giants: Rethinking the Role of Pension Funds' (2006) Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy 8, 26. 
23 Myners (n 21) Appendix A. 
24 Clark (n 16). 
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Myners’ main concern was that the relevant segment of the financial services industry – 
the market for investment consultancy and management – was highly concentrated and 
had developed a structure of competition which did not serve the interests of ultimate 
beneficiaries well. Investment managers competed to hit performance benchmarks. 
Trustees, presented with a market organised around these benchmarks, could conduct 
fund manager ‘beauty parades’, assessing the performance of managers against their 
peers. But this was not good practice: it resulted in herding around stock-market indices; 
where there was active investment management, it was short-term in its goals and costly 
in execution, with fees levied for transactions when a ‘buy and hold’ strategy would be a 
better fit with pension fund objectives. 
 
Myners alighted on trustees as the actors in the system who could change these practices, 
and had incentives to do so. However, he argued that they did not know and understand 
the industry well enough to challenge the advice of consultants. They lacked the 
resources and expertise to make investment decisions well. They spent insufficient time 
and effort on questions of asset allocation, and did not develop investment strategies to 
match their prime objective of meeting pension obligations.25 
 
Two themes recur throughout the Myners report: the need for advice to be contested and 
challenged, and the desirability of adopting an investment strategy that fitted the 
particular nature of pension fund liabilities. Myners emphasised that funds had different 
liability structures (some had more older and pensioner members, others a more youthful 
profile26) as well as different ‘risk appetites’ on the part of the sponsoring employer. 
Taking these factors into account, trustees should adopt ‘scheme specific’ investment 
strategies. This emphasis on ‘scheme specificity’ was central to Myners’ critique of the 
impact of regulation on pension fund investment. The 1995 Pensions Act had established 
a regime for checking that the accumulated assets of pension funds were adequate to 
cover the benefit promises that had been made (the liabilities that had accrued). Central to 
this regime was a valuation procedure centred on the Minimum Funding Requirement 
(MFR). Myners argued that this procedure had driven funds to make investments which 
matched the reference assets used to calculate MFR discount rates. The valuation rules 
were distorting funds’ investment decisions, and doing nothing for the security of pension 
promises in the process.27 
 
If trustees were to challenge investment consultants and insist on scheme-specific 
strategies, they needed to understand investment advice as well as knowing the nature of 
their own scheme. This implied that it was not sufficient that trustees seek expert advice; 
they should have some expertise themselves. Furthermore, the ideal trustee was not 
necessarily an industry ‘insider’, because trustees should be inclined to challenge the 
assumptions of advisers and the conventions of the industry. MNTs could fulfill this 
function: Myners did not see a conflict between his proposals for more trustee expertise 
and the statutory requirements for trustee boards to include a certain proportion of MNTs. 
                                                 
25 Myners (n 21) 1. 
26 Ibid 3.28 and fn 5. 
27 Ibid, Summary paragraph 64. 
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Trustees should think of themselves as accountable to members, and embrace 
transparency in investment decision-making, for example by providing an annual 
statement of investment principles (SIP) to members. Wider public scrutiny would also 
be valuable in making trustees think about whether their investment strategy is sound. 
Bodies in the wider public which could undertake this scrutiny included trade unions, 
pensioner support groups and the media .28  
 
Some of the tenor of Myners’ views can be illustrated by the issue of shareholder 
activism. Generally, the investment industry has not embraced activism, preferring to 
signal discontent with company management through exit (selling shares) rather than 
voice. To the extent that pension funds were being pushed towards activism, a good deal 
of the push was coming from members. Myners strongly endorsed activism,29 going so 
far as to report submissions which suggested that the investment industry’s lack of 
activism might reflect conflicts of interest which placed fund managers in breach of their 
fiduciary duties.30  
 
Myners’ embrace of contestation over investment advice and support for pluralism in 
scrutinising investment allocation took a more concrete form when he discussed the need 
for investment strategies to match the particular long-term nature of pension fund 
liabilities. The desirability of ‘asset-liability matching’ or ‘liability-driven’ investment 
strategies is uniformly endorsed in the investment management field, but the 
interpretation of exactly what these terms mean is contested. To give a succinct sense of 
the issues, we can focus on whether bonds are particularly suitable assets to match 
pension liabilities. 
 
For Myners, they were not. Writing in the context of the MFR, he argued that pension 
fund investment was excessively oriented towards bonds because funds tried to reduce 
volatility in valuations by matching MFR reference assets. Regulation had created an 
artificial bias towards bonds, which scheme-specific funding should go some way to 
remove. But his argument also implied a more general criticism of the notion that bonds 
are the assets that best match pension liabilities. In brief, the claim that bonds are 
matching assets rests on their effectiveness as a hedge for interest rate risk affecting the 
valuation of pension liabilities. If the present value of liabilities is calculated using a 
discount rate based on current interest rates, it follows that liabilities will rise when 
interest rates fall. Since bond prices go up when interest rates go down, the rise in 
liabilities is matched by an increase in the value of the scheme's assets.  
 
This ‘asset focused’ view of risk can be contrasted with an ‘income focused’ view. On an 
income-focused view, the liabilities of a pension fund are promises to pay benefits at 
specific times in the future. To match these promises, fund managers might seek assets 
which will provide a stream of income at corresponding future dates. It does not matter if 
the price of these assets is volatile, provided the income stream they deliver is secure.31 
                                                 
28 Ibid 8.33. 
29 Ibid, Summary paragraph 79. 
30 Ibid 5.86-7. 
31 Merton RC, 'The Crisis in Retirement Planning' (2014) July–August Harvard Business Review. 
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This is why pension funds can be ‘buy and hold’ investors, tolerating volatility in asset 
prices because they could afford to take a long view.  
 
Myners was sharply critical of the emerging trend for UK pension funds to shift into 
bonds, which he attributed to an asset-focused view of risk driven by the regulatory 
regime for pension fund valuation (the MFR). There is considerable academic support  
for his argument that bonds are not necessarily the best match for pension fund 
liabilities.32  Blake showed that, while the conventional understanding is that pension 
liabilities are ‘bond-like’, a matched portfolio based on the empirical characteristics of 
UK DB pension fund liabilities and the available assets would contain only a modest 
proportion of bonds.33 Surprisingly, property investments turned out to be well-matched 
with pension liabilities. This result was not idiosyncratic to Blake’s approach; a 
contemporaneous study by PWC found that most asset-liability matching (ALM) models 
produced a high weight on property, but this result was ‘often suppressed by the 
programmer’.34 
 
Summing up: for Myners, the small community of investment consultants had adopted 
conventional practices which should be challenged by informed trustees. They would 
need some expertise to make this challenge, as well as time and in-house support. The 
adoption of scheme-specific funding would advance the cause of less herding and less 
investment in bonds, provided trustees were sufficiently equipped to develop a suitable 
investment strategy for their own scheme. Myners’ approach was pluralistic, in that he 
saw public debate and challenge as fruitful for investment management. 
 
4. Expertise in the regulatory regime 
Myners’ recommendations were, apparently, warmly embraced, but it should not be 
forgotten that they landed in an environment in which key policy actors had other 
concerns. In particular, the government was dealing with other emerging difficulties with 
the MFR. The MFR was widely understood as ensuring that pensions were secure, but it 
did not promise or achieve this, and in the early 2000s there were some high-profile 
scheme failures where members were left bearing losses. In 2004, the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman announced an enquiry into complaints made by about 100 members and 
trustees of pension schemes, which claimed that the government had ignored evidence in 
failing to warn members of the risks to their schemes, and also had provided members 
and trustees with inaccurate information.35 Eventually, the government was forced to 
compensate those affected.  
 
In this context, Myners’ recommendation for a scheme-specific funding regime was very 
attractive, because it would place on trustees, rather than the government, the 
responsibility for assessing the adequacy of a scheme’s funding. However, the regulator 
                                                 
32 Bauer R, Hoevenaars RPMM and Steenkamp T, 'Asset Liability Management' in Clark GL, Munnell AH 
and Orszag JM (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income (OUP 2006). 
33 Blake (n 13) Table 3. 
34 Quoted ibid 49. 
35 Thurley D, 'Minimum Funding Requirement' (2008) House of Commons Library Standard Note: SN/BT/ 
1215, 13. 
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had a strong interest in ensuring that trustees produced the ‘right’ answer, because, if they 
made the wrong assessment, the newly-created Pension Protection Fund (PPF) would 
have to step in. Compared with the public liability that the MFR had created, the PPF 
promised less: accrued rights were only partly protected. This ‘co-payment’ by members 
should mitigate any tendency for trustees to take excessive risks, but studies at the time 
suggested that there could be some gaming of the PPF.36 It followed that it was necessary 
for the regulator to monitor the solvency of schemes in order to protect the PPF, and 
indeed this was one of the primary elements in the mandate bestowed on the newly-
created Pensions Regulator (TPR) in the 2004 Act. TPR monitored solvency in the only 
way it knew how: by focusing on the triennial valuation. In so doing, it took the opposite 
direction to Myners, upholding an asset-focused approach to risk and embracing the 
conventions that went with that. Compounded by changes in accounting standards that 
made companies more sensitive to valuation volatility, one effect was that UK funds 
continued their trend of moving out of equity and raising the share of bonds in their 
portfolios.37 
 
The main reception of Myners’ recommendations focused on the provision of training for 
trustees. TPR produced a Code of Practice for trustees which emphasised their duty to 
ensure that they had an adequate understanding of their functions, and a modular training 
programme called the Trustee Toolkit was developed. These initiatives were widely 
welcomed: for example, Cockerill argued that the emphasis in the legislation on ensuring 
adequate trustee skills and training ‘represent[ed] an opportunity for a step change in 
effective trustee governance.’38 
 
However, there is very little match between the Myners report and the training material 
produced by TPR. The focus of the latter is on trustees’ understanding of the analyses 
produced by actuaries and advisers: particularly, their understanding of how different 
assumptions affect the valuation. In the Toolkit, trustees are encouraged to think of how 
they can implement an investment strategy within an ‘integrated risk management’ 
framework. This framework, as developed by TPR, instructs trustees to think of 
investment allocation in terms of the division of the fund between ‘matching assets’ and 
‘growth assets’, where matching assets are deemed to be gilts and corporate bonds, and 
growth assets are equities, property and various kinds of alternative investment. The 
balance that trustees can strike between matching and growth assets depends primarily on 
the strength of the employer covenant.39 
 
The Toolkit gives a fair summary of current mainstream thinking about pension valuation 
and investment strategy, but it deviates substantially from Myners’ central arguments. 
First and foremost, it is highly oriented towards the triennial valuation. Myners was 
critical of investment strategies that were designed to minimise valuation volatility, yet 
that is effectively what the regulator advocates. The tolerable level of volatility depends 
                                                 
36 McCarthy D and Neuberger A, 'The Pension Protection Fund' (2005) 26 Fiscal Studies 139. 
37 Kay J, 'The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Interim Report' (2012) 
HM Government Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 4.8-4.9. 
38 Cockerill (n.9) 17. 
39 The Trustee Toolkit, Investment in a DB scheme, Tutorial 1 
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on the strength of the employer covenant: if a scheme goes into deficit and the covenant 
is deemed insufficiently strong, it is compelled to change (specifically, ‘de-risk’) its 
investment allocation. Furthermore, the classification of investments into ‘matching’ and 
‘growth’ categories is conventional and not empirically supported.40  
 
In short, the Codes of Practice for trustees, the Toolkit and other regulatory efforts to 
educate trustees incorporate conventional knowledge rather than promoting expertise. 
This is not a reflection on specific failings of the regulator: it works in close concert with 
the industry, and the Toolkit has been developed with industry advice. Within the 
industry, the issues raised here about the nature of matching assets are reasonably well-
known, yet no sense of disputation found its way into the Toolkit. Evidently, there is a 
strong drive to promote certain conventions. The following discussion seeks to illuminate 
the reasons why. 
 
5. The tension between expertise and representativity 
The discussion so far has shown that there is a significant and consequential gulf between 
the conventional application of financial expertise and the views advanced by critics. The 
conventional interpretation is asset-focused and biased towards investment in bonds, 
often described in financial sector shorthand as ‘de-risking’. Myners envisaged that 
trustees with expertise might challenge the asset-focused view of risk. They could be 
robust in accepting that triennial valuations would show volatility in scheme balances, 
and keep their eyes on the longer term, where so-called de-risking can substantially 
increase the risk that income from the pension fund will not be adequate to pay the 
pensions promised.41 
 
Myners offered few clues about where these exemplary trustees would be found. Given 
the available evidence that ENTs and MNTs lacked financial knowledge, one possibility 
endorsed by Myners was that ‘independents’ might be recruited who would be able to test 
and challenge the advisers to pension schemes. However, as the first section showed, 
there is little evidence that independent trustees do improve the running of pension 
schemes. This section considers the hypothesis that independent trustees are susceptible 
to a kind of agency drift because they are not primarily oriented towards serving the 
interests of employers or members. This can potentially produce a tension between 
expertise and representation, assuming that representatives do cleave faithfully to the 
interests of those they represent. 
 
Besley and Prat42 set up their analysis of pension fund trustees by positing that there can 
be two types: professional experts and caring insiders. Professional experts are assumed 
to be motivated by career concerns, and their performance is evaluated by their peers. 
Given the emphasis on financial expertise in pensions, it is safe to assume that these peers 
                                                 
40 See Blake (n 13). 
41 Jacka S and Hernandez E, 'Monetary risk and prudence in pension fund valuation' (2019) The Royal 
Society, London. Conference Proceedings: How should pension liabilities be valued? Risk aversion and 
demographic uncertainty.  
42 Besley T and Prat A, 'Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans' (2003) No. 03/09 IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). 
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are found in the financial services sector. Caring insiders have intrinsic motivation 
stemming from their responsibility to their fellows: they lack a wider career interest in 
financial services. Using this simple distinction, it is possible to make some predictions 
about the level of effort that the two types of trustee will put in, and the direction of that 
effort. Caring insiders will always make a certain amount of effort, whereas the effort 
invested by experts will depend on the relationship between effort and the outcomes 
monitored by peers. Besley and Prat provide only a brief sketch of what those peer-
monitored outcomes might be. One possibility is that peers monitor benchmarked 
investment returns, which implies that they would be susceptible to the herding behaviour 
that Myners criticised, or at least that they would fail to counter herding. More generally, 
there is no reason to suppose that professional experts drawn from the world of financial 
services will deviate from conventional practices if their performance is judged by their 
peers. Furthermore, there is a risk that professional experts will invest little effort 
compared to caring insiders: this will happen if the relationship between effort and 
outcome is very noisy: for example, if monitored investment returns are dominated by the 
effect of exogenous shocks. 
 
Davis43 saw the incentives of experts somewhat differently, taking the lack of evidence 
for the benefits of expertise as a sign that experts can have interests that conflict with 
those of members. His analysis implies that experts do know more than non-experts about 
the relationship between policy decisions and outcomes, but they misuse this knowledge 
to pursue outcomes that are not in the interests of members. Specifically, they have a 
conflict of interest with members over administrative fees and charges, allowing these to 
become inflated. They might derive excessive fees directly from the trust, or the sharing-
out of work can create a circuit of excessive remuneration. There are hints of similar 
issues among independent trustees in the UK, especially where corporate trustees have 
ties to large pension consultancies. For example, the Work and Pensions Select 
Committee hearings on the failure of the retailer BHS included exchanges with the 
professional chair of the trustees about the remuneration that his company derived from 
the scheme and its relationship to the scheme’s adviser, Willis Towers Watson.44  
 
If experts have interests which diverge from those of members and employers, this 
produces a tension between expertise and representation. The structure of the problem is 
often analysed in the political theory of delegation as follows.45 Experts know more about 
the relationship between policy decisions and outcomes than representatives; indeed this 
knowledge about the policy ‘production function’ defines their relevant expertise. Setting 
uncertainty and random events to one side, if experts desire outcome A, they know the 
policy that will achieve A. Suppose now that representatives desire outcome B, but they 
do not know the policy that will achieve B. If they make policy themselves, they may end 
up with C or D. If A is nearer to B than C or D, representatives will delegate to experts 
even though they know that experts do not share their preferences about the outcome, and 
                                                 
43 Davis (n 20). 
44 Work and Pensions Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Wednesday 25 May 2016, Questions 615-629 
45 Bawn K, 'Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures' 
(1995) 9 American Political Science Review 62. 
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will be able to use their knowledge to pursue their own preferences. Representatives will 
resent this ‘drift’ on the part of experts, but there is little they can do about it. 
 
This analysis is straightforward to apply to the case discussed by Davis. Outcome A is 
good investment performance with high fees; B is good performance with low fees. If 
representatives take over investment management, they will not achieve good 
performance (but instead C or D), so they resentfully pay the fees of financial experts. As 
it happens, advocates of passive investment strategies have offered a way out, 
demonstrating how B might be attainable by investing in tracker or index funds.  
 
The analysis can also be applied to the case discussed here, where the nub of the issue is 
that different groups of actors have different preferences about risk. As discussed above, 
ENTs can be expected to accept a relatively high level of investment risk in order to 
contain contribution costs, subject to various caveats.46 The standard expectation is that 
MNTs are more risk-averse, but this depends on the weight given to pensioner members 
compared with young members, as well as the degree of cost-sharing and the threat of 
scheme closure. The regulator has an incentive to contain risk, as it reaps no benefit from 
scheme risk-taking, while incurring reputational and PPF costs if schemes fail. Arguably, 
the incentives of independent trustees mirror those of the regulator: an independent 
trustee of a failed scheme incurs a reputational cost, but does not reap clear benefits from 
risk-taking. 
 
In this setting, the conflict between expertise and representation can be described as 
follows. Suppose that the regulator prefers de-risked outcome A, while the ENTs and 
MNTs prefer to accept more risk at outcome B. The policy to produce outcome B is not 
known to the ENTs and MNTs: it involves a complex sequence of interrelated decisions 
about investment strategy and valuation. Independent trustees understand investment 
strategy and valuation, and can steer these processes towards their desired outcome, 
which, due to their career concerns, is nearer A than B.  
 
An important objection to this type of argument is that it assumes that trustees make 
decisions in accordance with their own interests. The law is clear that trustees have a duty 
of loyalty, which means that they should not be unduly influenced by their personal 
interests, whether pecuniary or reputational. The political theory of delegation assumes 
that the interests of the relevant actors can readily be identified, and that actors pursue 
those interests. The theory is blind to the possibility that trustees are sincere in their 
insistence that they seek to do the right thing for the scheme as a whole. 
 
This objection gains force when the interests in question concern attitudes to risk and 
uncertainty. Uncertainty leads actors to have recourse to patterns of behaviour that are not 
calculative and strategic. They may turn to rules of thumb or ethical principles in 
response. Furthermore, actors like trustees have to formulate responses to uncertainty in a 
collective setting, in cooperation with other actors (other trustees and the scheme 
                                                 
46 In a more fully specified analysis, such as that provided by Blake (n 13), employers also take into 
account that a risky investment strategy is likely to make contributions more volatile (although lower 
overall).  
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executive, employers and the regulator). The adoption of common standards or principles 
facilitates agreement between the parties, reducing the transaction costs of uncertainty. In 
this setting, expertise in the form of conventional knowledge is valuable in bringing about 
cooperation and agreement. However, coordination around conventional knowledge can 
also produce bad outcomes. Arguably, the incentives to coordinate in finance are 
excessive, producing herding and instability.47  
 
It is possible to accept that (all) trustees are acting sincerely to produce the best outcome 
for the scheme, and nonetheless defend a pluralistic conception of expertise in which the 
varied social backgrounds of trustees lead to disagreement about the best course of 
action. But here we find another tension between expertise and representation, in which 
experts are portrayed as impartial and without interests, while representatives are 
impugned for their assumed responsiveness to interests. Both ENTs and MNTs are 
vulnerable to the claim that they cannot comply with the duty of impartiality if they 
participate in decisions which benefit them personally as sponsors or scheme members. 
However, the courts have set aside this concern when there are ‘substitute guarantees of 
fairness’ such as the presence of a balance of interests on the board of trustees.48 Issues 
regarding the impartiality of MNTs were addressed by s.39 of the Pensions Act 1995, 
which provides that MNTs should not be prevented from exercising their powers as 
trustees merely because such exercise may benefit them as members of the scheme.49 
 
However, TPR’s guidance on conflicts of interest betrays a different understanding to that 
upheld by Parliament and the courts. It is highly attentive to conflicts of interest affecting 
ENTs, arguing, for example, that it is ‘inappropriate’ for a trustee who is also the finance 
director of the employer to be involved in funding negotiations. Furthermore, ‘trustees 
who, for example, are scheme members or who hold trade union representative roles’ are 
also seen as susceptible to conflicts of interest.50 This conflates the representative role of 
ENTs and MNTs with a conflict of interest, and implies that representative trustees are 
less well-equipped for their role than independents. 
 
This is a tendentious position for the regulator to take. A consistent account of trusteeship 
might be based on trustees’ own interests or it might assume that trustees act sincerely in 
the interests of beneficiaries. If an own-interest analysis is adopted, it is possible to 
identify the interests of all trustees: independents as well as ENTs and MNTs. By the 
same token, if it is possible for some trustees – independents - sincerely to set aside their 
own interests and comply with the duty of loyalty, then it is possible for others (ENTs 
and MNTs). The regulator’s promotion of independent trusteeship appears in this light to 
be based on a biased account of trustee interests that constrains the pluralistic exercise of 
judgment and entrenches conventional expertise. Trusteeship does not have to be rule-
bound in this way. The pursuit of the common good means that each trustee sets to one 
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side the interests of the faction that placed them on the board, but it also means that 




This chapter has sought to investigate how the expertise of trustees might be expected to 
affect the operation of pension schemes. It has examined both the nature of expertise – 
whether it is conventional or pluralistic – and the nature of the agents carrying that 
expertise. While it is not inevitable that independent trustees bring conventional 
expertise, there is much in the regulatory set-up that points in that direction. Conversely, 
representative trustees (ENTs and MNTs) may have little expertise or may be highly 
receptive to conventional views, but they could also be important sources of pluralism in 
expertise. 
 
One interpretation of the decline of DB pensions in the UK is that regulation has driven 
schemes towards closure. The regulator has been an important promoter of conventional 
expertise. Independent trustees in particular might be seen as agents of the regulator, 
adopting similar views about the desirable level of risk in a scheme. Analysis of the 
interests of TPR and independent trustees, compared with the interests of ENTs and 
MNTs, supports this view. 
 
However, a more subtle process may be at work to defeat the pluralistic conception of 
expertise advanced by Myners and replace it with a set of conventional practices. The 
financial soundness of a pension scheme is profoundly uncertain. Practices around 
scheme valuation can be seen as attempts to manage this uncertainty by coordinating the 
beliefs of interested parties. In this process, expertise is important in lending authority to 
one set of beliefs over others, which facilitates coordination. We can see that experts 
themselves are affected by uncertainty, and seek reassurance in agreed positions. Despite 
the known limitations of an asset-focused approach to assessing risk, the approach offers 
a computable and replicable assessment of pension scheme soundness. It may be quite 
wrong or misleading in fundamental ways, but it provides a reassuring anchor for its 
users. 
 
It follows that the tension between representation and expertise runs more deeply than 
that identified by Davis.51 In Davis’s account, experts have different interests to 
representatives, and yet representatives must still rely on them. In the account advanced 
here, all parties are affected by uncertainty. Only the experts appear to offer a way of 
converting uncertainty into calculable risk. Even though there is much that is spurious in 
that calculation, representatives can offer nothing comparable. This is, fundamentally, the 
reason why Myners’ pluralistic vision has never come to pass. Representatives on trustee 
boards may have a strong sense that the investment strategy could be different and that 
the assessment of risk is flawed, but conventional financial models have a coordinating 
function and problem-solving capacity that is difficult to dispense with. 
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There are no simple prescriptions for resolving this problem, so long as risk management 
is essentially financial and financialised. Trustees can avoid the regulator’s Toolkit and 
develop more pluralistic expertise, but this could just make it harder to reach agreements 
about the soundness of schemes. The best alternatives for MNTs and ENTs may lie in the 
promotion of non-financial ways of managing risk. Most notably, faced with 
unexpectedly good or bad outcomes, representatives might agree to manage the 
consequences by renegotiating the benefits provided by the scheme. Renegotiation is not 
part of the regulatory approach to risk management, and legislation has constrained the 
renegotiation of accrued rights. Furthermore, the trend in UK pension fund governance 
has been to detach trusteeship of the pension fund from negotiations between employers 
and scheme members. The autonomy of trustees from employers and members steers 
schemes towards financial risk management. The fact that closure is more common than 
reform is an indication of the rigidity of this structure, perpetuated by the dominance of 
conventional expertise. 
 
 
 
